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Case No. 20110056-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL C MARTIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for criminal mischief, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-402(1). This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant 
violated the condition of his plea agreement that required repair work to be 
done by a licensed third party? 
Standard of Review. To prevail, defendant "'must show that the evidence 
of a probation violation, viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking 
defendant's probation.'" State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(quoting State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990)).] Whether defendant 
committed a violation is a factual finding, overturned on appeal only if it is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208-09 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATUTES 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-144,-2,-4 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal mischief, a second 
degree felony (count 1) and a third degree felony (count 2). R3-5. On September 
29, 2005, the State dismissed the second degree felony, in exchange for 
Defendant's no-contest plea in abeyance to the third degree felony. R3-5,51-58, 
59,188. The court also imposed conditions of probation. R55. Ten months later, 
on July 28,2006, the State filed an affidavit in support of an order to show cause, 
alleging that Defendant had violated the conditions of his probation. Rl08-09. 
After taking evidence, the district court revoked the plea in abeyance. R124-25. 
Procedures governing probation do not necessarily apply directly to 
pleas in abeyance. See State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59, <{f 10-17,21 P.3d 249. 
However, the termination of a plea in abeyance agreement, like the revocation of 
probation, is plainly a matter of a trial court's discretion. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-2a-4(l) (West 2004) ("If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that 
the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of 
the plea in abevance aereement, it mav terminate the aereement... ."). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On March 9, 2007, at a hearing scheduled for sentencing, the court sua 
sponte announced its intent to reduce the second degree felony that should have 
been dismissed pursuant to the plea bargain (count 1) to a third degree felony 
and to reduce the third degree felony (count 2) to which Defendant had entered 
his plea to a class A misdemeanor. R190:5. On April 20, 2007, the court 
sentenced defendant, imposing a suspended prison term of zero-to-five years on 
the third degree felony and a suspended jail term of 365 days on the class A 
misdemeanor. R131-33 at addendum A; R192:17-18. The court also ordered 
Defendant to serve 365 days in jail for the third degree felony. R132. The court 
declined to order restitution. R192:18. On May 8, 2007, the court held an 
additional hearing and issued a memorandum decision to correct its earlier 
ruling, vacate the sentence, and set a time for re-sentencing. R136-40. On May 
21, 2007, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the court's May 8th order. 
R141. This Court dismissed Defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because 
"there was no sentence and, therefore, no final order to appeal from/' State v. 
Martin, 2009 UT App 43, Tf 11, 204 P.3d 875 ("Martin I"). 
On August 28, 2009, the trial court sentenced Defendant to one year of 
probation, ordered him to pay "full & complete restitution," and ordered him to 
complete community service. R323-24; R444:9-10. On April 9, 2010, the trial 
court set restitution at $8,650. R344. A final restitution order was entered on 
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June 4,2010. R357. On June 24,2010, Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal. 
R363. 
This Court denied Defendant's appeal as untimely because it had not been 
filed within 30 days of his August 28,2009, sentencing. State v. Martin, 2010 UT 
App 238U, *1, 2010 WL 3361391 ("Martin IF); R373-74. This Court also noted 
that Defendant did not address any restitution or other post-conviction issues, 
but instead "attempted] to reach back to challenge his conviction/' Id. at n.l. 
Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion under Rule 4(f), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, to reinstate his right to appeal, and a motion for post-
conviction relief. R375-79. Counsel was appointed and requested a hearing on 
Defendant's rule 4(f) motion. R400. Defendant testified that after he had been 
sentenced, his attorney advised him that he had to wait until after the restitution 
hearing to appeal. R448:15, On December 17,2010, the trial court restarted the 
time for Defendant to appeal under rule 4(f). R443; R448:23,25-26. Defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal on January 7, 2011. R449. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is rooted in a dispute that arose in 2004 between neighbors in 
Salt Lake City's Avenues district. Defendant stated in his 2005 plea agreement: 
"I removed a fence that I believed was impeding a right of way that I believed I 
had to remove. I also removed a tree that I believed to be impeding the right of 
-4-
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way." R52. The tree defendant cut down was a mature elm, with a trunk 
diameter of approximately 28 inches and a height of 45 to 50 feet, valued at 
$4000. R69, 341, R197:40; 445:21-23; R446:70; State's Ex. 10. Defendant also 
removed a chain link fence on the north side of his neighbor's property and 
twelve high quality grape vines — California grapes — that had covered the fence. 
R197:5-6; 445:20,23-25. 
On September 29,2005, Defendant entered a no-contest plea in abeyance 
to one count of criminal mischief, a third degree felony. The State agreed to 
dismiss the other count of criminal mischief, a second degree felony. R51-58. 
The court explained to Defendant that if he did not satisfy the conditions of the 
plea agreement, "the Court will enter your guilty plea and you will be subject to 
punishment." R188:7. An express condition of the written plea agreement was 
"that the defendant replace the chain link fence and replant an elm tree that 
defendant removed, and replace the shrubs destroyed and to have the work 
done by a licensed third party." R55. 
The minute entry for the plea hearing also reflects the conditions imposed: 
"Deft to replace the chain link fence[;] Deft to replant an elm tree[;] Deft to 
replace the shrubs that were destroyed [;] All work to be done by a licensed third 
party." R60. Finally, during the plea hearing, the parties and the court 
specifically discussed employing a licensed third-party contractor to do the 
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work because of the victim's continued animosity towards Defendant. R188:13. 
Defendant's counsel affirmed there were "no problems with that," and a 
requirement that a licensed third-party contractor conduct the work was 
incorporated into the plea agreement. R188:13. 
Just over a month later, Defendant wrote a pro se letter to the court, asking 
to change his plea agreement to "read not guilty and dismissed," because he 
believed that he had met his court-imposed obligations. R63. In the letter, he 
acknowledged: "As I remember it, I was to hire a licensed contractor to do the 
work." Id. He added, "This I have done, and the fence is in the exact location 
that it was previously. I also was to replace a tree and this I completed also." Id. 
Around this time, the victim also wrote to the court, asking for restitution, 
alleging that Defendant had not followed the court's order to hire a third-party 
contractor to make the repairs, asserting that defendant had continued 
trespassing on her property, and expressing her frustration with the ongoing 
situation. R65. 
About one month later, the court held a hearing on Defendant's pro se 
motion to withdraw the plea.2 R195. Defendant's counsel acknowledged that 
Defendant had replaced the fence himself, because the contractor he had "set up 
2
 Eventually, defendant decided not to pursue his motion to withdraw 
the plea in abeyance and the court struck it. R189:3-4. 
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. . . bailed on him in the last minute, so [Defendant] tried to achieve it himself 
and patch the fence/7 R195:2. Defendant asserted that he "did have a licensed 
contractor do some of the work/' but the contractor "was slow," so Defendant 
"endeavored to do it himself," with the help of "another individual." Id. at 4. 
Defendant's counsel said the elm tree had not been replanted because it was 
"just one of those . . . trash trees," and it had grown back on its own, as had the 
shrubs. Id. at 3-4. 
The victim complained that Defendant had trespassed to install the fence.3 
R195:2, 5,9. She stated that Defendant had re-installed the same fence that he 
had torn out, and that it was "crooked," with "loose" posts; the fence was 
"cracked and crumbled and [would] not stand." R195:5. The gate could not 
open "because it's overlapped with wire." Id. The victim also disputed 
Defendant's claims that the elm he had cut down was a "trash tree," asserting 
that it had not erown back. Id. at 5-6. The court reminded Defendant that "the 
work was to be done by a licensed third-party. Those were the conditions." 
R195:4. The court also stated that "there was clearly an expectation that the 
replacement [of the tree and shrubs] would be done in a workman-like fashion." 
R195:6. 
3
 Defendant claimed he installed the fence on the victim's property 
without trespassing because the fence was located on an alleged easement. 
R195:2,9. 
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The court also forbade Defendant from entering the victim's property. Id. 
at 8-9. The court urged the parties to "try to address this privately and 
informally." Id. at 10. Because of the victim's continued complaints about 
Defendant's trespassing, the court issued a formal no contact order at a 
February 21,2006 hearing, and warned Defendant that he could be charged with 
criminal trespass if he re-entered the victim's property. R193:ll. 
On July 28,2006, the State filed an affidavit in support of an order to show 
cause, alleging that Defendant had violated the conditions of his plea 
agreement. R108-09. As of a January 19,2007, evidentiary hearing, Defendant 
still had not restored the victim's yard to an adequate condition. R197:5-ll, 17-
19. Defendant ultimately replaced the fence, but even after Defendant 
"reinforced" the fence it was "crooked," and remained "wobbly," having been 
set in the ground without cement to secure it. R197:45; 445:12,15, 40, 44. The 
gate would not close and the fence did not reach the corner of the property, 
leaving a gap large enough for animals to get through on both sides. R197:10, 
18-19; 445:15. The victim was never contacted by a third-party contractor about 
the fence replacement, nor about replanting the $4,000 mature elm that 
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Defendant had cut down or any of the grape vines he had removed.4 R109; 
R197:7,10. R445:12-17. The stump of the elm tree remained in the victim's yard; 
it required a "permit/license" to remove and replant because of its "proximity 
to a power pole." R445:15-16; R68. 
Defendant admitted that he had installed the fence himself, with the 
assistance of an "electrician slash handyman." R197:47-48; Def. Ex. 5, 7. 
Defendant acknowledged that the electrician was only licensed as an electrician. 
R197:51. Defendant testified that he did much of the fence installation himself, 
while the electrician helped in "finishing up the fence." R197:49-51. The 
electrician was not there throughout the entire installation. R197:50. Defendant 
"assisted with setting the post, which needed some expert assistance because I 
was taking a class in construction." R197:50. Defendant acknowledged that 
there "were no holes dug," but asserted that he "poured the concrete into the 
post to secure the design of the engineering that [Defendant] felt was necessary 
to help secure those posts/' R197:50-51. The electrician, meanwhile, "did most 
of the work, as far as tvine off of the fence, and installing; the electrical rod" for 
grounding. R197:50. 
4
 The grape vines Defendant removed eventually grew back but no longer 
produced fruit. Defendant claimed that the vine had never produced fruit in the 
first place because it was Virginia creeper, not a grape vine. R445:16-17; R446:52, 
55. 
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Defendant purchased a $29.97 maple sapling to replace the 45- to 50-foot 
elm tree. R197:9,54-55; State's Ex. 4. He mentioned no efforts to hire any third 
party to remove the stump or plant the sapling; instead he attempted to contact 
the prosecutor to let the victim know that she could "pick up the tree" or "give 
[him] directions as to what to do with it." R197:54-55. 
After the evidentiary hearing, the court revoked the plea in abeyance, 
stating my "ruling as to the plea in abeyance goes solely to not having all work 
done by a licensed third-party, period." R197:59. The court also admonished 
Defendant for violating the "spirit" of the plea agreement. Id. 
As of a November 6, 2009 restitution hearing, the fence remained 
inadequate, with "loose" posts and a gate that did not fit. R445:15, 44. The 
victim's yard still contained the stump of the mature elm tree and vines that 
would not produce fruit. R445:15,17. In ordering Defendant to pay restitution, 
the trial court found that the Siberian elm tree was worth $4,000, that replanting 
the grape vines would cost $3,000, and that it would cost $300 to remove the tree 
stump. R341, 343; 197:24-26; 445:23, 25-26, 34, 37-38.5 Installing a new fence 
would cost an estimated $1,200, which did not include the cost to survey the 
fence line and to tear down the existing fence. R342-43; R445:40-41. The court 
5
 An arborist testified that the tree could not be replaced by a tree of 
comparable size, but could be replaced with a 15-foot tree with a diameter of 12 
to 14 inches. R445:23; 28-29. 
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also noted that the victim had spent $300 in obtaining estimates. R342-43; 
R446:8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that he had violated 
the condition of his plea in abeyance agreement which mandated that "the work 
[must be] done by a licensed third party/' He contends that this provision did 
not prohibit him from doing some of the work, and that he substantially 
complied with it. Moreover, he asserts that the language of the provision is 
ambiguous. Aplt.Br. at 13-19. 
Defendant's argument borders on the frivolous. The language is 
unambiguous on its face. In context, considering the ongoing animosity 
between the parties, the import of the order is unmistakable. Any reasonable 
person would know that a licensed third party was to do all of the work. 
Indeed, Defendant demonstrated his actual knowledge that he knew he was not 
to do the work in a letter he wrote to the court. 
Defendant also did not substantially comply or act in good faith to 
accomplish the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. Defendant cut down a 
fifty-foot tree and fruiting grapevines and removed a fence. The plea in 
abeyance agreement directed Defendant to replace those items. Instead, 
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Defendant installed a wobbly fence, planted Virginia creeper, and bought a 
thirty-dollar sapling. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE CONDITION 
OF HIS PLEA AGREEMENT REQUIRING THAT REPAIR 
WORK BE DONE BY A THIRD-PARTY LICENSED 
CONTRACTOR 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ruling that he had violated 
the conditions of his plea agreement and asks this Court to reinstate his plea in 
abeyance. Aplt.Br, at 19. Defendant argues that he substantially and in good 
faith complied with the plea agreement by replacing the fence himself, with the 
assistance of an electrician and by purchasing a $30 maple sapling to replace the 
victim's $4,000 mature elm tree. Aplt.Br. at 14-18. He further asserts that the 
requirement for the work to be done by a third-party licensed contractor is 
ambiguous. Aplt. Br. at 9-13,16-17. 
Defendant's arguments border on the frivolous. See Utah R. App. P. 33(b) 
("[A] frivolous appeal.. . is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law/'). In order to succeed in his claim, Defendant "must show 
that the evidence of a [plea agreement] violation, viewed in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in 
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revoking" it. State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205,208 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State 
v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990)) (brackets added; emphasis in original). 
Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. The 
language directing Defendant to engage a third party to do the work was not 
ambiguous. Indeed, in context, its import was unmistakable. Moreover, the 
condition was reiterated multiple times on the record. R51-58,60; 188:13. Given 
the facts of this case, any reasonable person would know what constituted 
compliance with this condition of the agreement. In any event, Defendant 
demonstrated his actual knowledge of the condition at issue here when he wrote 
to the court and specifically acknowledged not only his responsibility to hire a 
third-party contractor to do the ordered work but also falsely represented that a 
third-party contractor did do the work. See R63. 
In terminating defendant's plea in abeyance, the court found: 
I think [defendant] frankly acknowledged, at least in my mind, 
the work was not done as ordered by a third-party. . . . 
And last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be done by 
a licensed third-party. You know, one of the reasons was — that 
is, so we wouldn't have this exact kind of issue. The fact is, color 
it however you want, he was out there with a third-party doing 
the work, and was not supervised by the third-party at all times. 
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[Tjhe order is all work being done by a third-party and you tell 
me he's just assisting, and somebody is looking over his 
shoulder. It's not being done by him [i.e. the third party]. And, 
frankly, he's [i.e. Defendant's] admitted that he wasn't 
supervised at all times by the third-party. 
R197:55-57 (Ruling attached at Addendum B). 
The key to understanding why the court did not abuse its discretion when 
it determined that defendant violated the condition of his plea agreement lies in 
its observation that "one of the reasons [for mandating the work be done by a 
third party] was - - that is, so we wouldn't have this exact kind of issue." Id. at 
56. The court uttered these words in January of 2007. "This exact kind of issue" 
refers to the continuation of the incendiary relationship between the victim and 
Defendant, who had been at odds since February of 2004.6 By that time, without 
permission or authority, Defendant had torn down a chain link fence on the 
victim's property, as well as the grape vines that covered the fence. R4,197:5-6. 
The victim lost both the privacy and security she had previously enjoyed in her 
back yard. R65. Less than three months later, defendant returned and cut down 
a mature elm tree on her property, leaving a five-foot-tall stump. R4; 197:7; 
445:15-16. Defendant was ordered "to have no contact with the victim" at his 
initial appearance. R9. 
6
 In a letter to the district court, the victim rhetorically asked, "Is there 
pain and suffering? Well, he is the biggest pain I have suffered in my adult 
years." R. 65. 
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By the time Defendant entered his plea, nearly a year and a half had 
passed since the victim had been left without a fence, grape vines, or a mature 
tree in her back yard. R51. She was still upset and agitated over Defendant's 
interference with her property. R188:13. Accordingly, during the plea hearing, 
the parties and the court specifically discussed employing a licensed third-party 
contractor to do the work to avoid any further confrontation between the 
parties: 
State: We're asking, Your Honor, that this repair be done by a 
licensed third party because there is still some animosity 
with [Defendant] personally being there [on the victim's 
property]. 
The Court: Is that a term and condition [of the plea]? 
Defense Counsel: We have no problems with that. 
The Court: All right. We'll incorporate that, then, into the terms 
of the plea in abeyance. 
R188:13. 
On October I, 2005, Defendant sent a letter to the court stating that he 
understood he "could change the plea in the time period identified and put back 
the fence and tree that my neighbor claimed I damaged As I remember it, I 
was to hire a licensed contractor to do the work This I have done." R63 (emphasis 
added). 
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About two months later and just under two years since her ordeal began, 
the victim wrote to the court in frustration, alleging that Defendant had 
continued to trespass on her property and that he had not hired a third-party 
contractor to fix the damages. R65. She wrote, "I have been as patient as my 
personality allows, but the limit has been reached." Id. 
At two subsequent hearings before the hearing on the order to show 
cause, the court clearly reiterated the condition that Defendant now claims was 
ambiguous. See R188:13; 195:4. On January 13, 2006, after Defendant had 
inadequately repaired the fence himself and the victim had complained that he 
had violated the court's order, the court reiterated, "The tree was going to be 
replaced, the shrubs were going to be replaced that had been destroyed and the 
work was to be done by a licensed third-party. Those were the conditions/7 
R195:4. 
At no time did the trial court indicate that Defendant could have any part 
in the process nor did the contentious circumstances of the case give rise to any 
reasonable inference that he could be involved in anv wav. Indeed, the victim's 
animosity towards Defendant was palpable. See id. at 3,5,8-9. On February 21, 
2006, the court again recited the conditions of probation, concluding that "all of 
that work was to be done by a licensed third-party contractor." R193:2. The 
hearing concluded with a long discussion of the court's no contact order, which 
-16-
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plainly reflected the victim's ongoing agitation and anger over Defendant's 
continued intrusions onto her property. Id. at 7-10. 
In this case, the plain meaning of "licensed third party" excludes 
Defendant from participating in any of the work. Defendant is not a third party 
and he has presented no evidence to suggest that he is licensed to perform any 
of- the construction duties required by the plea agreement. Even if the term 
"licensed third party" were ambiguous on its face, the circumstances 
surrounding the plea agreement make its meaning unmistakable. The language 
requiring a licensed third party was inserted into the agreement specifically 
because the victim requested that Defendant stay off her property and not do 
any of the work. R55, 60; R188:13. From the time of Defendant's initial 
appearance it was clear that he was to have "no contact" with the victim. R9. 
Defendant even acknowledged that he understood he "was to hire a licensed 
contractor to do the work." R63. The court reminded Defendant of this 
condition at more than one hearing. R195:4; 193:7-11. 
Moreover, any reasonable person in Defendant's position would have 
understood that, beyond hiring a third-party licensed professional, Defendant 
was not to have any part in completing the repair work. Under these 
circumstances, Defendant's claim borders on the frivolous. He has asserted no 
legal or credible factual basis on which to claim that the court granted him 
-17-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
authority to participate in any way in the ordered repair work. Indeed, within a 
month of the court's order, when defendant wrote to the court asking to change 
his plea, he stated: "As I remember it, I was to hire a licensed contractor to do 
the work/' R63. Thus, in addition to the court's clear order, defendant 
conceded that he had actual knowledge that he was not to do the work. 
Finally, no citation to authority is required to show that Defendant neither 
substantially complied nor acted in good faith to fulfill the conditions of the plea 
in abeyance agreement. As stated, the plain terms of the plea agreement made it 
clear that Defendant was to hire a licensed third party to replace the fence, and 
replant the elm tree and grape vines that he had torn from the victim's yard. 
Defendant was informed of this condition and agreed to it. R 55; R188:4,13. He 
told the court he understood the condition. R63. However, Defendant chose not 
to comply with his plea agreement. Instead, Defendant did much of the work 
on the fence himself, installing a "wobbly" fence that had gaps big enough for 
animals to get through. R197:10, 18-19; R445:15, 40, 44. He was aided by a 
licensed electrician, who was apparently neither licensed nor competent to 
install fences. R197:51; 445:40, 44. Instead of removing the stump and 
replanting a mature elm, Defendant purchased what he thought was a maple 
sapling and did nothing with it. R197:9, 54-55. Indeed, while the court ruled 
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that Defendant did not 'Violate the letter'' of the plea condition by replacing a 
50-foot tree with a sapling, it also asserted that he had "absolutely violated the 
spirit of the agreement." R197:56, 58-59. Defendant also did not replace the 
California grape vines he had torn out, but instead planted a "nuisance" 
shrub — Virgina Creeper. R197:17; 341; 446:38-39. This was all in direct violation 
of his own understanding that he was to "hire a licensed contractor to do the 
work." R63. 
In this case, Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal mischief, 
second and third degree felonies, respectively. He pleaded no contest to a 
reduced class A misdemeanor. This plea was held in abeyance on condition that 
Defendant repair the damage he had done to the victim's yard, by hiring a 
licensed third party to replant an elm tree and shrubbery and rebuild the fence 
he had torn down. R55. He now asks this Court to ignore that he breached the 
plea agreement by violating the plain term that a "licensed third party" was to 
do the work. He does so by asking this court to find either that the agreement 
was so vague that he could not understand what it required of him, or 
alternatively, that he substantially complied with its terms. Aplt. Br. at 9-18. 
Both claims fail. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted the £&_ day of October, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-l 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
"iChapter 2A. Pleas in Abeyance fRefs & Annos) 
••§ 77-2a-l. Definitions 
For the purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that 
he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, following 
acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
Laws 1993, c. 82, § 3. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-2 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
"HChapter 2A. Pleas in Abeyance fRefs & Annos) 
•*§ 77-2a-2. Plea in abeyance agreement—Negotiation—Contents—Terms of 
agreement—Waiver of time for sentencing 
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to entry of judgment 
of conviction and Imposition of sentence, the court may, upon motion of both the prosecuting 
attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction 
against the defendant nor impose sentence upon the defendant within the time periods contained 
In Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a plea in abeyance and 
at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any plea in abeyance agreement unless the 
defendant shall have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court hearing relating to a 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(4)(a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the defendant 
and approved by the court shall include a full, detailed recitation of the requirements and 
conditions agreed to by the defendant and the reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in 
abeyance. 
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i 
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and felonies, the agreement 
shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance by the court, be executed by the prosecuting 
attorney, the defendant, and the defendant's counsel in the presence of the court. 
< 
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months if the plea was to 
any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years If the plea was to any degree of felony or to 
any combination of misdemeanors and felonies. 
I 
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, before the court, 
and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently waives time for sentencing as designated 
in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
r • 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1993, c. 82, S 4. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-2a-4 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
liChapter 2A. Pleas in Abeyance fRefs & Annos) 
"•§ 77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement—Hearing—Entry of judgment and 
imposition of sentence—Subsequent prosecutions 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, information comes to the 
attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that the defendant has violated any condition 
of the agreement, the court, at the request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate 
motion and affidavit, or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to 
appear before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not 
find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be 
terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to 
substantially comply with any term or condition of the piea in abeyance agreement, it may 
terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the 
defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the defendant as a piea in abeyance 
fee prior to termination of the agreement shall be credited against any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry of judgment of 
conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any independent prosecution arising from any 
offense that constituted a violation of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the 
original plea was placed in abeyance. 
Laws 1993, c. 82, 5 6. 
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was not done as ordered by a third-party. 
At least what I've heard — and IT11 let 
you address it if you want. One, I don!t hear 
anything to suggest he's violated the no contact 
order. Two, the shrubbery, no real basis for finding 
that. Three, the tree, frankly, the order is 
ambiguous. If it wasn't ambiguous, you wouldnTt be 
offering that sapling as a replacement, thatTs — 
certainly doesn't violate the letter; you' ve 
absolutely violated the spirit of the agreement. And 
last, though, is the third-party agreement, that it be 
done by a licensed third-party. You know, one of the 
reasons was — that is, so we wouldn't have this exact 
kind of issue. The fact is, color it however you 
want, he was out there with a third-party doing the 
work, and not supervised by the third-party at all 
times. 
MR. KURUMSJDA: The only argument I?d 
offer, Your Honor, is: The work is supposed to be 
done by a third-party, but it's not — 
THE COURT: All work. 
MR. KURUM&DA: ItTs not — it doesn't 
prohibit him from assisting a third party. And that's 
what he's doing, he's trying to assist labor to cover 
the costs. 
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1 THE COURT: You can sit down. 
2 MR. KURUMADA: That's --' 
3 THE COURT: Well, then all work isn!t 
4 being done by a third-party. I mean, the order is all 
5 work being done by a third-party, and you tell me he' s 
6 just assisting, and somebody is looking over his 
7 shoulder. It's not being done by him. And, frankly, 
8 he's admitted that he wasn't supervised at all times 
9 by the third-party. 
10 You can step down, Mr. Martin. 
11 THE WITNESS: All right. 
12 MR. KURUMADA: We'd rest. 
13 MR. BURMESTER: We'd submit it, 
14 Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. I'm revoking the 
16 plea in abeyance. 
17 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, we would ask 
18 I that we do a PSR, and that way we can determine a 
19 value of the restitution, and then we can just talk 
20 J about money instead of different people putting things 
21 in question. 
22 THE COURT: I'll make it clear for the 
23 record: There are four allegations, I believe, in the 
24 affidavit. 
25 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, I think the 
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1 one is just an assertion that the Court made some 
2 orders, so it would really be three allegations of 
3 violation: Two, 3 and 4. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Kurumada, if you think I'm 
5 wrong, this is your chance to argue, but I'm letting 
6 you know what ITm thinking. 
7 Let me put it differently: I know you 
8 think I'm wrong, this is still your chance to convince 
9 me, but that's — 
10 MR. KURUMADA: Well, all I would say, 
11 Judge, is that I think Mr. Martin did the best he 
12 I could in terms of respecting the Court's order. He 
13 did have someone who did the majority of the work with 
14 respect to the fence. It wasn't as — it wasn't maybe 
15 as good as Ms. Randazzo wanted, but she also wanted 
16 and eight-foot vinyl fence, too, and that was totally 
17 not in the spirit of the plea negotiation or the plea 
18 I in abeyance, 
19 I THE COURT: Clearly not. 
20 I MR. KURUMADA: And, you know, he was 
21 I supposed furnish a tree. You are not going to be able 
22 to go out and find a 50-foot elm tree. 
23 THE COURT: You can find replacement 
24 trees. It's expensive, but that's what happens when 
25 you chop down mature trees. 
I _ 5 8 
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1 Now, I understand that we didnft talk 
2 about it, and I donTt know if I would have ordered, 
3 you know, a 50-foot elm tree or — what I do know, it 
4 wouldn't have been a sapling. It wouldn!t have been 
5 something that has about a -- you know, two-inch 
6 diameter either. 
7 MR. KURUMADA: Uh-huh. 
8 THE COURT: Be that as it may, I'm not 
9 revoking on that because of the ambiguity. 
10 MR. KURUMADA: That's fine — 
11 I THE COURT: I'm just indicating for 
12 purposes of my ruling, I do believe it's ambiguous. I 
13 do believe that Mr. Martin at least violated the 
14 spirit of that, but because of its ambiguity, in no 
15 way, shape or — no way, shape or form --in ruling 
16 that he violated the plea in abeyance as a result. 
17 My ruling as to the plea in abeyance goes 
18 solely to not having all work done by a licensed 
19 third-party, period. 
20 MR. KURUMADA:.. Okay. I understand. 
21 THE COURT: That's the sole basis. 
22 MR. KURUMADA: Do you want to set — do. 
23 you want a PSR? 
24 THE COURT: Do I need a Presentence Report 
25 for this? 
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